Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission\u27s Use of Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods by Hazen, Thomas L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1979
Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of
Injunctions and Other Enforcement Methods
Thomas L. Hazen
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of Injunctions and Other
Enforcement Methods, 31 Hastings L.J. 427 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol31/iss2/2
Administrative Enforcement: An
Evaluation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Use of
Injunctions and Other
Enforcement Methods
By THOMAS L. HAZEN*
Introduction
In recent years, federal administrative agencies have played an in-
creasingly significant role in the substantive regulation of business. De-
spite much sentiment calling for a change in this trend,' direct
regulation of rates and charges, coupled with the broader authority of'
"umbrella" agencies, continues to have significant impact on industry
in general. One federal agency involved in this trend is the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is armed with a wide range of
licensing and general enforcement powers under the federal securities
laws.2 Both in terms of size and breadth of authority the SEC is a
super-agency, second only to the Federal Trade Commission 3 (FTC).
Increased regulatory activity and growing concern over regulation
in general have created a climate in which reconsideration of existing
regulatory agencies is in order. Recently Congress revamped many of
* Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law; B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972, Colum-
bia University. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Ruth Peter-
son, J.D., 1979, University of Nebraska.
I. See, e.g., C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977); G. STIG-
LER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975).
2. See notes 31-36 & accompanying text infra.
3. The FTC was established in 1914 and has regulatory authority over a wide variety
of subject matter under several statutes including the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976); the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); the Flammable
Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191-1204 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); the Wool Products Label-
ing Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1976); the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1976); and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1974
& Supp. 1979). See generally G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924).
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the FTC's procedures,4 reflecting its awareness that the passage of
nearly sixty years and the increased use of the agency called for a reex-
amination. More recently, after ten years of preparation, the American
Law Institute approved the final draft of the proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code,5 which would have substantial impact on SEC operations.
The code most likely will be introduced in Congress this year,6 but if it
is to be adopted, the legislative hearings which no doubt will ensue put
passage years away.
SEC enforcement mechanisms have been attacked by commenta-
tors.7 This attack, together with the timeliness of the proposed code,
calls for an examination of the current SEC enforcement scheme. After
a brief overview of the administrative process in general, this Article
explores the SEC's exercise of enforcement authority both in terms of
efficiency and the legal standards applying to that authority. Consider-
ation is given to possible improvements under the present statutory
base and to alternative methods of operation. Specific attention is ac-
corded to the need for increased administrative enforcement sanctions,
particularly with respect to an expansion of the Commission's investi-
gatory and adjudicatory power at the administrative level.
8
The Theory of the Administrative Process
Despite the existence of administrative agencies in this country for
190 years, 9 the mere definition of administrative law remains unclear.
In light of the rapid increase in agency regulation in the twentieth cen-
4. See generally Tyler & Erickson, The Federal Trade Commission Today: The New
Improved ImprovementsAct, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 849 (1976).
5. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978). Seegenerally Lowenfels, The
Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA. L. REV. 615 (1979); Symposium-
The American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 311
(1977).
6. Coombe, Chairman's Report, 34 Bus. LAW. 1147 (1979); Proposed Securities Code
Faces Long, Uphill Struggle, 65 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1979).
7. E.g., Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters. Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases, and
Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303 (1973); Lowenfels, SEC "No Action" Letters:
Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1256 (1971); Lowenfels, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission Investigations: The Needfor Reform, 45 ST. JOHNS L.
REV. 575 (1971).
8. Because many of the SEC's problems are endemic to administrative enforcement in
general, much of the discussion which follows applies with equal force to the various federal
agencies and their operation.
9. Regulation of the Collection of Duties on Tonnage and on Merchandise, 1 Stat. 29
(1789). See generally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:6 (2d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS TREATISE].
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tury, '0 defining the field and its salient characteristics becomes essential
to any evaluation of administrative jurisprudence."
The distinction between the procedure and the substance of the
regulatory process has been urged as one method of defining adminis-
trative law. 12 This dichotomy may be illusory, however, for practically
speaking both are intertwined in the operation of administrative bod-
ies. 13 A functional analysis of agency activity would appear to be a
more helpful basis for examining the administrative process. Justice
Holmes suggested the following functional distinction between judicial
and legislative law making:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand
looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new
rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power.14
An examination of various types of administrative activity sug-
gests that an administrative agency is an attempt to combine these
functions, and in some instances a third, prosecutorial function, by
vesting a single entity with the power to carry them out. Accordingly,
agency functions may be divided into three major subdivisions: (1) leg-
islative, including the interpretation of legislation through rulemaking
and other interpretive pronouncements; (2) judicial, including the adju-
dication of private disputes as well as the imposition of remedial or
penal sanctions in resolving them; and (3) prosecutorial, including the
10. Approximately two thirds of the federal peace time agencies have been created
since 1900. 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 9, §§ 1:7-1:9.
11. Many commentators have attempted to develop theories of administrative power.
E.g., F. BLACHLY & M. OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION
(1934); M. CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1948); J. CHAMBER-
LAIN, N. DOWLING, P. HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES (1942) [hereinafter cited as THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION]; 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra
note 9, ch. 2; E. FREUND, R. FLETCHER, J. DAVIES, C. POUND, J. KURTZ & C. NAGEL, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923); R. POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1942); Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614 (1927); Fuchs,
Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538
(1938).
12. "Thus, when we deal with the questions of the propriety of granting certain powers
to an agency or the fairness of its rule making, adjudicative, or investigative processes, we
are in the realm of administrative law; but where an agency such as the National Labor
Relations Board issues an order finding a certain practice of an employer to be an unfair
labor practice, the law which that order makes really belongs in the field of labor law." M.
CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 16 (1948).
13. The procedural aspects are of course significant and have been subjected to careful
scrutiny and analysis. See generally 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 9.
14. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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investigation and enforcement of violations of the governing statutory
scheme. Each of these functions may be fulfilled through the use of a
number of powers; each function serves a different end and not all
agencies are empowered to enter each of these areas. 15
The legislative function can take two forms. An agency may have
express statutory authority to set the limits of permissible conduct' 6 or
may have power merely to establish interpretive guidelines to stat-
utes.17 These interpretations occur by way of rulemaking, private letter
rulings, no action letters, advisory opinions, and interpretive releases.
Empowering administrative agencies to perform legislative activities
can be justified on the basis that the delegation of a complex area of
regulation from congressional generalists to administrative experts will
enable the agency to better administer legislation. Additionally, legis-
lative power in agency hands permits more fluid regulation and, be-
cause of the nature of the political process, increases the ease of review
and amendment of legislative decisions. Theoretically then, the combi-
nation of these factors will result in a more legitimate regulatory proc-
ess, adaptable to the changing demands of the subject matter of the
regulation.
The second administrative power-to adjudicate disputes--can
operate as another way to inject expertise into the governmental proc-
ess, by substituting the agency for the generalist judge. Other ratio-
nales for administrative adjudicatory authority include expediting the
resolution of disputes and unburdening court dockets. 18 Use of this
adjudicatory power has occurred in four different types of disputes: 19
disputes solely between private parties;20 disputes between a private
party and the government;2 1 use of licensing or disciplinary power;
22
15. See 1977/78 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1978).
16. E.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West Supp. 1979).
17. This function has been characterized as administrative expressions of policy. THE
JUDICIAL FUNCTION, supra note 11, at 58.
18. A great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to administrative jurisprudence
and thus repetition here is not warranted. Seegeneral, F. BLACHY & M. OATMAN, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934); THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION, supra note
11, at 58; 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 9.
19. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION, supra note 11, at 2-9.
20. Examples include disputes before workers' compensation boards, the Department
of Agriculture, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. See id at 3. A greater informal-
ity than court proceedings and the increase in expediency resulting therefrom are two of the
justifications advanced in favor of agencies exercising this type of judicial function. Id
21. Id at 7.
22. Id at 4. This frequently is the basis for the broadest type of regulation. Examples
include the Federal Trade Commission's ability to discipline for unfair trade practices, 15
U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (West Supp. 1979), and the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
[Vol. 31
and, finally, disputes over the grant of government benefits such as vet-
erans' compensation claims.
23
The third basic administrative function is that of investigator and
enforcer. An agency may handle a complete prosecution or may refer
it to a prosecutorial body once the investigation is finished.24 To the
extent that an agency such as the FTC or the SEC has power to impose
sanctions, it may operate as both a prosecutor and a judge, Le., in both
investigatory and adjudicatory capacities. Generally this dual function
is handled by a division of authority within the agency.
25
In addition to enforcement power that can result in administra-
tively imposed sanctions, some agencies have authority to seek compli-
ance orders by securing injunctive relief in the courts.26 Although less
efficient than administrative adjudication, the primary advantage of an
injunction over other forms of judicial enforcement is "the ease and
speed with which it may be obtained. '27 This contrasts with criminal
sanctions, which require higher standards of proof as well as more
stringent procedural and constitutional guarantees. As discussed more
fully below,28 the injunction does have some significant inherent limita-
tions, including the lack of any deterrent or compensatory byproducts
and its minimal utility in dealing with one time violations.
The use of these three modes of regulation by any particular
agency can be assessed accurately only in light of the substantive regu-
lation involved. Furthermore, these powers presently vary widely
throughout the various federal agencies. Of the fifty-five federal agen-
Board (NLRB) over certain employment and labor practices, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. I
1977). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) represent examples of licensing
authorities, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (West Supp. 1979); 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976); 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 10901-10933 (West Supp. 1979). See generally THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION, supra note 11,
at 4-7.
23. See THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION, supra note 11, at 8-9.
24. When an investigation reveals possible criminal wrongdoing, agencies have the op-
tion of turning over their findings to the Attorney General for prosecution. See note 43 &
accompanying text infra.
25. For example, the SEC, which has a highly compartmentalized bureaucratic struc-
ture, separates its investigators and litigators from the hearing examiners.
26. See generally Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of
Federal-Agencdes, 57 YALE L.J. 1023 (1948).
27. Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of FederalAgencies,
57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1948). "In contrast with severe sanctions such as criminal prosecu-
tion, which must be carefully restricted to avoid swamping jury calendars, the injunction
may be handled expeditiously and encourages consent decrees. It also takes a lighter toll of
investigative as well as litigative facilities ... .". Id at 1048 (footnotes omitted).
28. See notes 148-205 & accompanying text infra.
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cies, nineteen have prosecutorial power, twenty-seven have adjudica-
tory power, and forty-six have legislative power.29 Only fourteen
agencies have all three powers. 30 Although general principles will
emerge from the examination of any particular regulatory scheme,
overgeneralization should be avoided both because of the varied pow-
ers available to different agencies and because of the inability to fully
separate administrative procedure from the substance of the activity so
regulated. This is not, however, to minimize the more general lessons
that can be learned from the examination of the SEC which follows.
The Work of the SEC
The Securities and Exchange Commission is entrusted with several
multi-faceted functions under the Securities Act of 1933, 31 the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,32 the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 33 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,3 4 the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 3 5 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.36 In adminis-
tering these acts the Commission is vested with each of the three basic
agency powers.
The legislative power of the SEC is reflected in its capacity as
rulemaker, both in an advisory capacity and as an implementation tool
29. These figures are based on the number of "agencies" listed in the 1977/1978 United
States Government Manual and do not include departments or other governmental units
with similar powers. See 1977/78 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1978). How-
ever, this distinction between "agencies" and "departments" is subject to dispute; hence, the
figures given should be considered as guides only.
30. See 1977/78 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1978).
31. Ch. 38, Title I, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West
1971 & Supp. 1979)). See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Loss]; Johnson & Jackson, The Securities and Exchange Commission: Its Organiza-
tion and Functions Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1937).
32. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1971
& Supp. 1979)). See generally 2 Loss, supra note 31, at 1165-528; Redmond, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: An Experiment in Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 622 (1938).
33. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (West
1971 & Supp. 1979)).
34. Ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb
(West 1971 & Supp. 1979)).
35. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-I to 80a-52
(West 1971 & Supp. 1979)). See generally North, A Brie/History of Federal Investment Com-
pany Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969); Rosenblatt & Lybecker, Some Thoughts
on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements
and the ALl Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 587 (1976).
36. Ch. 686, Title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-
21 (1976)).
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for federal statutes.37 Certain sections of the acts specifically empower
the Commission to promulgate rules having the force of statutory pro-
visions. For example, section 3(b) of the 1933 Act 38 gives the Commis-
sion power, within statutory limits, to promulgate additional
exemptions from the registration provisions of the Act. Similarly, sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act39 provides that the Commission
shall promulgate rules to determine the scope of antifraud liability. In
contrast to this type of rulemaking, the Commission also has promul-
gated interpretive rules to aid corporate and financial planners and to
supplement statutes.4°
In addition to its dual rulemaking activities, the SEC gives unso-
licited advisory opinions in the form of releases, which may include
guidelines or suggest interpretations of statutory provisions or rules.
One step below the interpretive releases as an expression of policy are
the so-called "no action" letters. In these letters the Commission re-
sponds to requests from private parties for rulings that, based on the
facts supplied by the inquirers, the Commission will take no action.
This ad hoe method of advising not only is cumbersome and time con-
suming but also fails to provide the practitioner with any significant
precedential or predictive aid.
4 1
Beyond these administrative functions, the Commission has regu-
latory oversight and quasi-judicial power over brokers, dealers, and the
37. For a discussion of the many facets of the SEC see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1974). See also H.
KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
(1979); 3 Loss, supra note 31, at 1877-2015; Cary, Review of the Work of the Securities and
Exchange Commission-1961-1964, 19 RECORD 458 (1964); Dean, Twenty-five Years ofFed-
eral Securities Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
697 (1959); Dodd, The United States Securities and Exchange Commission: 1942-1946, 10
MOD. L. REv. 255 (1947); Ratner, The SEC.- Portrait of the Agency as a Thirty-Seven Year
Old, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 583 (1971); Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934- An
Experiment in Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 622 (1938); Symposium-Securities Regula-
tion, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 647 (1964).
38. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West Supp. 1979); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.240, 230.251-.263 (1978).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-1 to .10b-17 (1978).
40. Section 23(a) of the 1934 Act expressly vests the Commission with this type of inter-
pretive rulemaking authority. Examples of such rules include the recent "safe harbor"
guides to exemption from the 1933 Act's registration provisions. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144,
230.146, 230.147 (1978).
41. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
33 n.a (4th ed. 1977); Hipple & Harkelroad, Anomalies of SEC Enforcement: Two Areas of
Concern, 24 EMORY L.J. 697 (1975); Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: InformalAdvice as a
Discretionary Administrative Clearance, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 95 (1972); Lowenfels,
SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts With Existing Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases,
59 VA. L. REv. 303 (1973).
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exchanges that it licenses under sections 6, 15, and 19 of the 1934 Act.42
Correlative to this power is the agency's ability to impose administra-
tive disciplinary sanctions upon those subject to its licensing authority.
Moreover, with regard to all of the legislation it administers, the Com-
mission performs a prosecutorial function. This function is served by
conducting initial investigations, by forwarding recommendations to
the Department of Justice or the Attorney General,43 and by bringing
civil suits for injunctive relief against private parties who are in viola-
tion of the various acts.44
As this brief overview suggests, the SEC has a well stocked arsenal
of enforcement weapons. The sections that follow focus on the
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the SEC, the current uses
of the various enforcement techniques and their success rate in terms of
the goals of the SEC and the legal constraints of the agency's organic
acts. The Article next examines various alternatives to present SEC
enforcement practices, including those suggested by the proposed new
code.45 This examination reveals that an expansion of the range of en-
forcement weapons is in order, and that such an expansion will enable
the Commission to perform its burdensome task more efficiently.
SEC Enforcement Powers
As noted in the preceding section, the Commission's enforcement
powers allow it to sit as an adjudicatory body with sanctioning power,
investigate potential criminal violations, and seek injunctive relief in
civil cases. These latter two powers derive from the Commission's re-
sponsibility to investigate and police violations of all the statutes it ad-
ministers.46 Nonetheless, the effectiveness of both criminal actions and
civil injunctive relief are limited.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (Supp. 11977). This includes similar oversight responsibilities with
respect to national securities exchanges under § 6 and broker-dealer self governing organiza-
tions under § 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1976).
43. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)-(c) (1976). See, e.g., Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC
Investigations: Laying the Foundationfor Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Adminis-
trative and Criminal Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567 (1975); Mathews, CriminalProsecutions
Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes.- The Nature and Development of
SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971); Note, Penal and Injunctive Provi-
sions of the Securities Act, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 251 (1938); Comment, Investigatory Powers of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 YALE L.J. 819 (1935).
44. Eg., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). See generally Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Ac-
tions, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 969 (1972); Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC CivilActions: The Scope
of Judicial Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 328 (1974); Note, 1977-78 Securities
Law Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 757, 822-32 (1978).
45. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976). See Symposium, Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws,
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Because a reasonable level of efficiency is difficult to establish in
terms of success rate, time spent, and economic cost, criminal prosecu-
tions are rarely pursued.47 The constitutional and procedural safe-
guards that accompany criminal trials are more extensive than in the
civil context. Elements of proof-specifically the scienter and mens rea
requirements-are more difficult to establish than in civil proceedings.
Furthermore, criminal proceedings utilize far more governmental re-
sources. After the SEC makes its initial investigation, if the facts devel-
oped so warrant, the matter is turned over to the Attorney General.
The Justice Department then works with the SEC preparing for the
grand jury and for trial. These two arms of government may in turn
avail themselves of the additional investigatory resources of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.
Consequently, the bulk of SEC investigations resulting in any en-
forcement action are on the civil side of the docket. This is not to say
that the civil side is significantly more efficient. Even at the investiga-
tory stage, the procedure can be quite cumbersome and expensive as
the Commission often must go to court even to enforce its subpoena
power.
48
In addition to the foregoing enforcement and prosecutorial func-
tions, a large portion and perhaps the most efficient aspect of the Com-
mission's enforcement activities arises under its adjudicatory function
from its licensing powers. Although these powers are found in all of
the statutes that the SEC administers,49 the following discussion is lim-
ited to the two primary statutes, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.
Under these two acts, the SEC exercises broad disciplinary powers
over those persons and entities subject to its licensing powers. Under
the 1933 Act, the sanctions available to the Commission without judi-
cial proceedings revolve around the Act's registration requirements.
24 EMORY L.J. 555 (1975); Note, Penal and Injunctive Provisions of the Securities Act, 23
WASH. U.L.Q. 251 (1938). See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
47. See notes 106-08 & accompanying text infra.
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); Peoples Bank of Danville v. Williams,
449 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Va. 1978); SEC v. Murray Director Affiliates, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Challenges to SEC
authority also are couched in terms of constitutional violations. E.g., OKC Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 461 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Tex. 1978); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); SEC v. Gilbert, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Snc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,556
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Interview with Monroe Freedman, BARRON'S, February 21, 1977,
at 3.
49. The Commission's adjudicatory powers extend beyond the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
See notes 31-36 & accompanying text supra.
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Specifically, the SEC, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, either
can delay, suspend, or deny the effectiveness of the registration state-
ment.50 A concomitant power is the Commission's ability to prevent or
suspend the use of a prospectus.51 Both of these responsibilities fall
within the licensing category because they merely prevent or inhibit the
use of a registered offering.52 In contrast, the sanctions available under
the 1934 Act are more varied.
Pursuant to section 6 of the 1934 Act the Commission is charged
with overseeing national securities exchanges. 5 3 Although the power
has been exercised only once,54 the SEC may suspend or revoke regis-
tration of an exchange.5 5 The SEC also has the power to expel individ-
ual broker-dealers from a national exchange.5 6 The 1934 Act
additionally charges the SEC with overseeing registered securities as-
sociations and other broker-dealer self-regulatory organizations.
5 7 It
can suspend or revoke an association's registration,5 8 as well as suspend
or expel a member of the association.5 9 Also, by virtue of its registra-
50. Section 8(b) empowers the Commission to issue a refusal order where the deficien-
cies are apparent upon the face of the registration materials. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1976).
Section 8(d) gives the SEC the authority to issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of
the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1976). See, e.g., Oklahoma-Texas Trust v.
SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939); In re Red Bank Oil Co., 20 S.E.C. 863 (1945).
51. This power is contained in § 10(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1976).
52. See note 22 supra. To some extent the collateral effects of such sanctions may go
beyond pure licensing. For example, SEC Rule 252(e)(1) denies the availability of Regula-
tion A's qualified exemption where the issuer, underwriter, or any partner, officer, or direc-
tor thereof has been subject to a § 8 sanction within the past five years. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.252(e)(1) (1978).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
54. San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2) (1976). See, e.g., Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1943).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78q-1, 78s, 78c(a)(26), 78c(a)(34) (1976). The Commission is
the reviewing authority for sanctions imposed by the exchanges, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), and other self-regulatory organizations pursuant to §§ 6(d),
15A(h), 17A(b)(5), and 19(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d), 78o-3(h), 
7 8q-
l(b)(5), 78s(d)-(f) (1976). See generally Lowenfels, A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Adminis-
trative Process.: Disciolinary Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 COR-
NELL L. REV. 375 (1979); Poser, Reply to Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402 (1979); Note,
Governmental Action and the National Association of Securities Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 585 (1979). For a recent case discussing the SEC's standard of review of NASD disci-
plinary sanctions, see Sartain v. SEC, 601 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Bradford Nat'l
Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the Commission's over-
sight responsibilities).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2) (1976). See, e.g., Don D. Anderson & Co. v. SEC, 423 F.2d
813 (10th Cir. 1970) (suspension for violation of 1934 Act); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1965) (expulsion for violation of 1933 Act); Financial Counsellors, Inc. v. SEC, 339 F.2d 196
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tion of broker-dealers, 60 the Commission has the power to suspend or
revoke such registration. 61 Finally, the Commission can bar any per-
son from associating with a broker-dealer,62 a member of a registered
securities association,6 3 or an investment adviser,64 or bar that person
from serving in various capacities with a registered investment com-
pany.65 However, with respect to all of the powers discussed above, the
Commission can impose the less drastic sanction of censure.66
In addition to the foregoing sanctions against broker-dealers, as-
sociations, and individuals, the Commission has broad powers with re-
spect to securities registered under the 1934 Act and their issuers.
Section 12(a)(1) requires registration of all securities traded on a na-
tional exchange, 67 while section 12(g)(1) provides for the registration of
equity securities by issuers with more than five hundred shareholders
and over one million dollars in assets.68 Violations of these registration
requirements, including misleading or fraudulent acts and filings, can
lead to various SEC imposed sanctions. The Commission can of course
deny, suspend, or revoke the registration of a security on a national
exchange. 69 The Commission also has the power to order a summary
suspension of securities trading in either securities exchanges or over-
(2d Cir. 1964) (expulsion for violation of 1934 Act); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1959) (suspension for violation of 1933 Act).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1976). See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967) (revocation); Peoples Securities Co. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961) (denial of
registration); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959) (suspension). The
Commission has parallel authority over investment advisers under the 1940 Advisers Act.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1976).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1976). See, e.g., Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.
1978); Chatham v. SEC, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,705 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Collins
Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Stead v. SEC, 444 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.
1971); Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-14668 (April 17, 1978); Security Exchange Act
Release No. 34-14918 (July 3, 1976).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3) (1976). See, e.g., O'Leary v. SEC, 424 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-14759 (May 15, 1978).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3() (1976).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1976).
66. See notes 55-65 supra; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14761 (May 15,
1978).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1976).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (1976). See, e.g., Holmes v. Cary, 355 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1966)
(denial); SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958)
(suspension); Securities Exchange Release No. 34-5706 (June 2, 1958) (withdrawal). See
generally Poser, Stock Exchanges, I CoRp. L. REv. 253 (1978) (Trading Halts and Suspen-
sions).
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the-counter trading.70 Unlike its power with respect to broker-dealers
and members of registered securities associations, the Commission does
not have the express power to bar persons from associating with issuers
subject to either 1933 or 1934 Act registration.
The 1934 Act gives the SEC broad discretion in fashioning sanc-
tions, with the sole limitation that any measure "be necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest."' 71 In applying its own standards, however,
the Commission imposes the more severe sanctions reluctantly.72 Fur-
thermore, the Commission is held to a high standard of proof in estab-
lishing violations. Although a significantly less stringent standard than
that required in a suit for injunctive relief, there must be "substantial"
or "clear and convincing" evidence supporting findings of a violation.
73
Additionally, when acting upon the findings of an administrative law
judge, the Commission can affirm only after a full review of the rec-
ord.74 These requirements suggest that there are adequate procedural
safeguards to imposing severe sanctions, an especially significant con-
cern in considering the effect of agency adjudication on subsequent pri-
vate damage actions.
75
In terms of the four instances of administrative adjudicatory
power discussed earher,76 the SEC's sanctioning authority is limited to
its licensing power. Any disciplinary authority is couched expressly in
terms of those persons and entities subject to registration requirements;
those directly related to regulation of the marketplace, not to the regu-
lation of the internal affairs of issuers whose securities are subject to
registration requirements. This distinction is important in considering
any changes in SEC regulation. A primary reason is the need to avoid
undue incursions upon internal corporate affairs, an area properly re-
served to the corporate chartering authority. 7 7 On the other hand, reg-
ulation of the securities markets inevitably affects chartering matters to
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78/(k) (1976). See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14649
(April 11, 1978).
71. E.g, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2) (1976).
72. A classic example of the SEC taking a light-handed approach to a clear violation is
found in In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).
73. See, e.g., Chatham v. SEC, [19781 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,705 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Whitney v. SEC, [1979]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,913 (D.D.C. 1979); 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 148 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Berkley Land & Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 575 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1978); 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.17(e) (1978).
75. See notes 188-205 & accompanying text infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
77. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391.
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some extent. The Commission's greater powers over broker-dealers,
registered securities associations, and exchange members, in contrast to
its powers over issuers, may well be an attempt to maintain a proper
balance between market regulation and corporate chartering.
Despite the need to maintain this balance, to the extent that the
integrity of the market place warrants SEC intervention, use of admin-
istrative sanctions against issuers and affiliated persons should not be
disregarded. The value of administrative adjudicatory power in this
area is worth examining because of its efficiency, the potential for ex-
pansion of this adjudication under the current scheme, 78 and because
of possible legislative reform. Moreover, as discussed below, expansion
of administrative adjudicatory power to cover issuers and affiliates
need not extend the reach of SEC regulation, but rather can be
achieved by an expansion of the range of existing remedies. Accord-
ingly, the issue becomes whether this expansion will result in increased
efficiency and flexibility without undue incursion upon corporate char-
tering matters.
Suspension of the Right to Practice Before the Commission
SEC Rule of Practice 2(e) provides that the Commission may sus-
pend, limit, or bar "any person" from practicing before it "in any
way."' 79 This broad language would appear to give great leeway in ap-
plying sanctions against both individuals and corporations who would
not otherwise be subject to SEC administrative disciplinary proceed-
ings.80 Although the Commission has the express power to impose
sanctions against broker-dealers and persons associated therewith,
78. See notes 79-103 & accompanying text infra.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1978) (emphasis added). The regulation provides that the
Commission "may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practic-
ing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice of an
opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to repre-
sent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abet-
ted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws ... or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder." Id. Although the SEC's power under this rule has been challenged in
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,742
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,854 (2d Cir. 1979), there has
been no judicial indication that the rule is invalid. See notes 223-24 & accompanying text
infra.
80. Section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act provides: "The term 'person' means a natural per-
son, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a govern-
ment." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976). See also § 2(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)
(1976).
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there is no comparable power with respect to issuers. 8' Imaginative
application of Rule 2(e)'s suspension power could aid in filling this gap.
Notwithstanding the broad language of Rule 2(e), its application
to date has been limited to disciplining professionals, 82 specifically at-
torneys83 and accountants. 84 Even this use of the 2(e) sanction has been
questioned. 85 The validity of the disciplinary sanction is especially vul-
nerable in light of the absence of express statutory authority for its pro-
mulgation. In Touche Ross Co. v. SEC,86 however, the Second Circuit
upheld the rule as consistent with the Commission's overall statutory
mandate:
We reject appellants' argument for several reasons. First, it is
clear that the SEC is not attempting to usurp the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to deal with "violations" of the securities laws. The
Commission, through its Rule 2(e) proceeding, is merely attempting
to preserve the integrity of its own procedures, by assuring the fitness
of those professionals who represent others before the Commission.
Indeed, the Commission has made it clear that its intent in promul-
gating Rule 2(e) was not to utilize the rule as an additional weapon
in its enforcement arsenal, but rather to determine whether a per-
son's professional qualifications, including his character and integ-
rity, are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the
Commission ...
Moreover, an examination of the policies underlying the securi-
ties laws indicates that, contrary to appellants' assertions, the Rule is
not inconsistent with the Commission's statutory authority.87
The court's reasoning emphasizes that Rule 2(e) has a valid role, not as
a remedy for violations of the securities acts, but as a tool to maintain
the integrity of practice before the Commission. 88
81. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
82. See generally Bialkin, Sanctions Against Accountants, 8 REV. SEC. REG. 823 (1975);
Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities ofAttorneys in Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary
Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules ofPractice, 25 MERCER L. REV. 637
(1974); Miller, The Distortion and Misuse ofRule 2(e), 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 54 (1979).
83. E.g., In re Carter, 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-I (March 14, 1979).
84. E.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,854 (2d Cir.
1979).
85. Miller, The Distortion and Misuse ofRule 2(e), 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 54 (1979).
86. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,854 (2d Cir. 1979). The settlement of this 2(e)
proceeding included a notable provision, namely, that Touche Ross submit itself to peer
review of its auditing practice. In re Touche Ross, Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-
15978, reprinted in 510 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) H-I (June 27, 1979).
87. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,854 (2d Cir. 1979). But see In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-15982, reprinted in [1979]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,992-97 (July 2, 1979).
88. At least one member of the Commission's enforcement arm has stated that Rule
2(e) sanctions may be imposed for misconduct that does not rise to the level of substantive
securities law violations. Landau, Legal Opinions Rendered in Securities Transactions, in
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By their own terms, the Rules of Practice are applicable to "pro-
ceedings" before the Commission, "particularly those which involve a
hearing or opportunity for a hearing,"89 but not to investigations. The
provisions of the 1934 Act governing the registration of unlisted securi-
ties provide that no application shall be granted without notice and
opportunity for a hearing 90 and thus the Rules of Practice expressly
apply. Similarly, there is a protracted certification process for registra-
tion of securities to be listed on a national exchange.91 Although there
is no express opportunity for hearing, the Rules of Practice would still
apply if this certification process were designated as a proceeding.
Also, because the Commission has oversight responsibilities with re-
spect to national exchanges, 92 the hearing at the exchange level93 may
suffice to call the suspension authority of Rule 2(e) into play. Finally,
sections 15 and 19 of the 1934 Act give the Commission registration
powers and oversight responsibilities with respect to brokers and deal-
ers both directly and through their self-regulatory organizations, such
as the National Association of Securities Dealers94 (NASD). Once
again, the suspension power of Rule 2(e) could be applied in these pro-
ceedings.
All of the foregoing registration provisions include periodic report-
ing requirements. 95 The 1933 Act registration requirements entail SEC
filings, 96 as do the proxy rules97 and the provisions regulating corporate
takeovers.98 To the extent that any or all of these filings and registra-
tion applications legitimately can be denominated as Commission pro-
ceedings, the suspension power found in Rule 2(e) can have dramatic
impact. For example, officers and directors who violate reporting pro-
visions conceivably could be suspended from practice before the Com-
mission. Depending upon the scope of the officers' duties this might
mean that they must resign their positions, at least pending the dura-
tion of the suspension. Otherwise their companies would be running
PLI, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 3,37 (1977) (remarks of The-
odore Sonde, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1 (1978) (Rule of Practice 1).
90. Section 12(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(2) (1976).
91. Section 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1976).
92. Sections 6 and 19 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1976).
93. [1979] N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1091-103.
94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78s (1976).
95. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78p(a) (1976).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g (1976).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to .14a-102 (1978). See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)-(f) (West 1971 & Supp. 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(t) (1976).
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afoul of the provisions of the same reporting requirements.99 This
prejudice, or even disability, to issuers is not without precedent, as the
SEC has exercised similar powers over past violators,'0 ° brokers, and
dealers. 101 Consequently, the current regulatory scheme may well con-
tain a wealth of untapped SEC sanctioning power.
Such use of Rule 2(e) or any other administrative sanction against
issuers and their affiliates, officers, directors, and major shareholders
must be tempered. The regulatory role of the SEC derives from its
responsibility for the maintenance of an orderly marketplace. As has
been discussed, however, once this regulation is extended to the issuers
themselves, there is immediate tension between ownership rights and
investor protection and the risk of undue incursions upon the province
of state corporate chartering statutes.102 This tension must be consid-
ered before expanding the scope of Rule 2(e).
On balance, the Commission could use the power under Rule 2(e)
as a means of more efficiently achieving current enforcement goals. In-
sofar as the Commission currently institutes civil enforcement proceed-
ings against officers and directors in federal district courts, 10 3 use of this
one-step sanctioning power would increase efficiency and benefit re-
spondents by providing a speedier resolution of the controversy. The
Rule 2(e) remedy is not currently employed by the Commission as a
means of policing the marketplace. However, such use of Rule 2(e)
would not require legislative reform. Furthermore, to the extent that
such suspensions are applied to participation in SEC filings on the
same basis as in other proceedings, expanded use of Rule 2(e) would
merely extend currently available powers without expanding the scope
of SEC regulation.
The Need for Increased Efficiency
Granting the SEC a multitude of powers, including an expanded
application of Rule 2(e), is of little value if the Commission is unable to
99. In a somewhat analogous situation, the SEC, in settlement, recently has suspended
an accountant from practice before the Commission based on reporting violations occurring
when he was the chief financial officer of the offending issuer. In re Martin E. Davis, Ac-
counting Services Release No. 267, reprintedin 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,289 (July 2,
1979); see also SEC v. Hamilton, 511 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-28 (D.D.C. 1979).
100. For example, ancillary relief granted pursuant to a court-ordered injunction re-
sulted in prejudice to past violators. E.g., SEC v. Cosmopolitan Inv. Funding Co., 42 SEC
ANN. REP. 119 (1976).
101. See notes 46-78 & accompanying text supra.
102. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets.: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and ManagerialAccountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391.
103. See notes 115-22 & accompanying text infra.
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exploit such powers effectively. Examination of the Commission's past
enforcement activities can aid in evaluating the ability of the SEC to
use available sanctions and remedies. One significant comparison is
the breakdown of the number of investigations resulting in criminal
actions, civil injunctive suits, and SEC administrative proceedings.
The SEC now handles many times the number of docketed investiga-
tions handled at its inception.1° 4 Through 1976 the Commission had
instituted more than 11,700 docketed investigations.10 5 Of these inves-
tigations, 1,621 criminal cases were referred to the Justice Depart-
ment,10 6 resulting in 1,228 indictments 07-approximately a 75%
success rate. Of the 5,276 defendants indicted, 2,846 were convicted,
resulting in a conviction rate of nearly 55%.108 Despite this success,
criminal cases represent a small part of the Commission's overall activ-
ities.
In contrast to the criminal side of the SEC enforcement program,
the Commission had instituted 2,770 civil injunctive suits through
1976.109 During this time both the use of the SEC injunction and the
number of SEC suits disposed of by settlement increased signifi-
cantly. 0 Settlement is an attractive alternative to litigation for all in-
volved. The opportunity to merely consent to not repeat an infraction
lessens much of the sting to any defendant while saving courts and the
Commission from expending time, effort, and expense."'
The SEC's record reveals that, notwithstanding vigilant Commis-
sion activity, the number of violations continues to rise. Staffing limita-
tions have, or soon will, prevent the SEC from being able to keep up
with violators. One solution might be to increase the enforcement staff
of an already highly staffed agency. In a time of concern over govern-
mental spending and expansion, however, this does not appear to be
the optimal solution. Another approach might be to shift much of the
enforcement power to the private sector by expanding the scope of pri-
vate remedies. This too is unlikely to be an available solution as the
104. See 1-42 SEC ANN. REP. (1935-1976).
105. See 1-42 SEC ANN. REP. (1935-1976).
106. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 228 (1971); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 207 (1976).
107. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 228 (1971); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 207 (1976).
108. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 228 (1971); 42 SEC ANN. Rep. 207 (1976).
109. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 226 (1971); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 206 (1976).
110. One estimate suggests that the Commission settles about 90% of its cases. Interview
with SEC Commissioner Irving Pollack, 484 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-4 (Jan. 3,
1979). See also 41 SEC ANN. REP. 98 (1975).
111. See Klein, A Response on SEC Consents-Process Is Corruling All, Legal Times of
Washington, June 26, 1978, at 20, col. 1.
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Supreme Court seems to be moving in the opposite direction, and limit-
ing private remedies in the securities area." 2 A viable variation might
be to increase the efficacy of private enforcement with the use of SEC
ancillary relief' 13 or by increasing the collateral estoppel effect of SEC
injunctive actions. 14 A final alternative, advocated here, is to expand
the scope of SEC administrative sanctions, thereby increasing effective
enforcement while reducing costs. Before the case for expanded ad-
ministrative sanctions can be made, however, one must examine the
ability of current practice, i e., use of injunctions in the courts, to
achieve the Commission's goals.
The SEC as Enforcer in the Courts
The SEC Injunction Action
Despite express statutory authorization for SEC injunctive re-
lief,115 this is the mode of regulation in which effectiveness and effi-
ciency issues become most acute. This is true not only because of the
low success rate in these suits,116 but also because of the questionable
effect of the injunctions issued. More specifically, the bare prohibitory
injunction results merely in an order prohibiting the defendants from
repeating certain conduct in the future. If the prohibited conduct is
repeated, the eventual remedy depends upon still further judicial action
in which the SEC, through the Justice Department, seeks to have the
defendant held in contempt of court. Also, because many frauds or
112. E.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979) (re-
stricting the definition of "security"); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(requiring a showing of deception in a suit under Rule 1Ob-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. I (1977) (denying a private right of action under the Williams Act to a com-
peting tender offeror); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter
in a private damage action under Rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff in a Rule lOb-5 suit must be a purchaser or seller of the securities
in question).
113. See notes 123-45 & accompanying text infra.
114. See notes 148-87 & accompanying text infra.
115. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976). See note 118 & accompanying text infra. Seegener-
ally 3 Loss, supra note 31, at 1975-84; Jaeger & Yadley, Equitable Uncertainties in SEC
Injunctive Actions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639 (1975); Loomis, Enforcement Problems Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAW. 665 (1959); Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforcing the Account-
ability of Corporate Management and.RelatedActivily ofthe SEC, 32 VA. L. REV. 497 (1946);
Wax, The Emerging SEC Injunction, 17 N.Y.L.F. 687 (1971); Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC
Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 328 (1974);
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1975).
See also Mathews, A.L. . Proposed Securities Code. Part XV-Administration and Enforce-
ment, 30 VAND. L. REV. 465 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mathews].
116. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
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other violations are one time occurrences, the simple injunction has lit-
tle deterrent effect. Furthermore, insofar as it is issued after the fact,
the decree has neither a remedial nor prophylactic effect. Despite these
difficulties the Commission continues to expend time and energy seek-
ing injunctive relief. 1
7
An analysis of three factors-the standards of proof the commis-
sion must meet, the potential for expanded use of ancillary relief, and
the trend toward settlement of SEC actions-shows that despite some
potential for improving the effectiveness of SEC injunctive actions, se-
vere limitations remain. Before examining the impact of ancillary re-
lief and the effect that injunctive suits can have on private litigation, it
is necessary at least to note the standards for securing judicially
awarded injunctions.
Under each of the acts it administers, the SEC has the authority to
seek either temporary or permanent injunctive relief in the courts
"[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is en-
gaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation." 8 The statutes speak in terms of continu-
ing and future violations, thus making the remedy seemingly inappro-
priate for past violations. As the Second Circuit recently announced,
"[i]t is well settled that the Commission cannot obtain relief without
positive proof of a reasonable likelihood that past wrongdoing will re-
cur" and that there is "something 'more than the mere possibility which
serves to keep the case alive.'"119 Accordingly, the SEC frequently
must prove the reasonable likelihood of future substantive violations,
despite proven past violations, or no relief will be granted.120 This is a
much more stringent standard than the Commission's adjudicatory
sanctioning power,' 21 which merely requires that the public interest
117. See notes 104-14 & accompanying text supra.
118. 1933 Act, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976). This language is echoed in the 1934,
1935, 1939, and 1940 Acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 79r(f), 80b-9(e) (1976).
119. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 405 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973). See also SEC v. Aaron,
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Continental Advisers, [1979]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,842 (D.D.C. 1979).
120. See, e.g., SEC v. Koracorp. Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d
801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp.
715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
121. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976). See text accompanying notes 49-74 supra.
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warrant the relief. On the other hand, the test for an injunction is not
so stringent as to require the Commission to prove the threat of irrepa-
rable harm.
22
SEC injunctive relief in the courts thus is a limited remedy. It is
most useful when used to prevent violations before they occur. Unfor-
tunately, absent a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining or-
der, delay and crowded dockets may eliminate the SEC's ability to
prevent injury to investors. Although the two mechanisms discussed
below may increase the effectiveness of SEC injunctive relief, an in-
junctive action nonetheless may remain ineffective because of the in-
ability to use this remedy against prior non-recurring violations.
Ancillary Relief
Notwithstanding that the enabling provisions of the securities acts
speak solely in terms of the SEC's power to enjoin violations, 2 3 the
SEC and the courts have fashioned remedies ancillary to the traditional
injunctive decree, relying on "the general equitable powers of the fed-
eral courts."' 124 Such ancillary relief has taken many forms, ranging
from disgorgement of ill-gotten profits 25 to more imaginative correc-
tive action. Among such imaginative remedies are the appointment of
an independent majority on the board of directors, 12 6 the appointment
122. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Cal-Am. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976).
124. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1779, 1781 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Farrand]. See generally Ellsworth, Disgorgement in
Securities FraudActions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641 [hereinafter cited as Ells-
worth]; Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of
Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 397 (1979); Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies
Under the Securities Acts and the Growth of Federal Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 47 (1975); Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level
Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976); Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and
the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. (Special Issue) 121 (1974); Comment, Court-Ap-
pointed Directors- Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO.
L.J. 737 (1976); Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suitsfor Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79
HARV. L. REV. 656 (1966); Note, SEC Injunctive and Ancillary Relief Under Rule I0b-5: A
Scienter Requirement?, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 872; Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC En-
forcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975).
125. E.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082
(2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (197 1). See generaly Ellsworth, supra note 124.
126. See SEC v. Vesco, 571 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1978). See also SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [ 1974-
75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974) (consent sanctioned).
See generally Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts and the
Growth of Federal Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1975).
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of a receiver, 127 prohibitions against exercising voting control in a
proxy battle, 28 the appointment of "special professionals" to assure
compliance with securities laws, 129 additional reporting require-
ments, 30 orders designed to protect remaining assets, 131 and prohibi-
tions of continued participation as an officer or director of any public
company. 32 Most recently, the Commission secured the judicial ap-
pointment of a "special independent officer" to assure compliance.
33
Although the appointment of a receiver, restitution, and protection
127. E.g., SEC v. United States Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Florida Bank Fund, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,707 (M.D. Fla. 1978); SEC
v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 94,920 (S.D.
Fla. 1974).
This power is expressly given to the Commission by § 42(e) of the Investment Company
Act for violators of the Act's registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1976). How-
ever, the remedy has been applied as a matter of the courts' general equity power. See
generally Farrand, supra note 124, at 1784-89.
128. E.g., SEC v. Westgate California Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6142, 3 SEC
Docket 30 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1973) (settlement order). Cf. Chris-Ciaft Indus. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (defendant barred from
voting for five years on shares obtained ilegally). See generally Farrand, supra note 124, at
1792 n.74.
129. E.g., SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15, 18-19 (Ist Cir. 1977), arffg 421 F.
Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1976); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 461 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) A-I1 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (consent decree). See generaly Farrand, supra note 124, at
1792-93.
130. See generally Farrand, supra note 124, at 1792-93.
131. Eg., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974). See generally Farrand,
supra note 124, at 1797-1800.
132. SEC v. Cosmopolitan Inv. Funding Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7366 (April
23, 1976); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 119 (1976).
133. SEC v. Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,920 (D. Ariz. 1979). One commentator has broken down ancillary remedies into thirteen
categories: "(1) appointment of a receiver, (2) appointment of a special trustee or a special
fiscal agent; (3) restitution or 'disgorgement' of profits; (4) appointment of independent
members of boards of directors and special committees of the board including audit commit-
tees, executive committees, and litigation and claims committees; (5) appointment of 'special
counsel' to conduct a court supervised investigation to file a report of the investigation with
the SEC and the court, and to recommend and pursue claims against prior management and
others on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders; (6) orders requiring rescission of-
fers; (7) 'freeze' orders or a temporary trust; (8) orders requiring an accounting; (9) orders
requiring filing of additional reports concerning financial condition or securities transac-
tions; (10) orders requiring attorneys or accountants to disclose to future clients past viola-
tions of law or inability to practice before the SEC, requiring attorneys to furnish the SEC
with all opinion letters issued, or requiring reports of all securities transactions to the SEC;
(11) orders restricting or precluding purchase or sale of shares, voting of shares or proxies, or
otherwise influencing or participating in management of an issuer or its subsidiaries and
affiliates; (12) orders requiring establishment of new supervisory and compliance proce-
dures; and (13) orders requiring 'guarantee of losses' or 'hold harmless' protection for an
issuer." Mathews, supra note 115, at 538-41 (footnotes omitted).
November 1979] SEC ENFORCEMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of assets can be viewed as supplemental investor protection, the less
drastic remedies are more directly related to assuring future compli-
ance. These less drastic forms of relief would appear to fit more closely
within the preventive focus of the acts' injunctive provisions than the
more remedial forms of relief, which tend to place the Commission in a
position of consumer-or investor-advocate.
One caveat must be recognized with respect to ancillary relief. An
overzealous approach to the SEC's pursuit of ancillary remedies would
lead to an undue incursion upon corporate governance issues that are
more properly left to corporate chartering statutes. 134 While there is no
question that reform is needed in this area, it should not be accom-
plished by the SEC under the guise of investor protection. Rather, the
task of considering corporate governance should be undertaken on its
own merits. 135 An example found in one area of SEC enforcement ac-
tivity which intrudes upon the corporate chartering function with re-
spect to internal governance should serve to illustrate the danger.'
36
Since 1976, the Commission has favored requiring independent
audit committees. In fact, such a rule was adopted in 1977 for issuers
whose securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 37 In
1978, the SEC's general counsel stated that the Commission had the
134. Lengthy debate over the direction of the modem corporation recently has acceler-
ated. See generally Symposium-Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1247
(1979); Symposium-Reweaving The Corporate Veil, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. I (Summer
1977).
135. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and ManagerialAccountability, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 391.
136. A potentially greater incursion into the realm of corporate autonomy may result
from the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 202,
203, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498-99 (1977). The Act amended the Securities Exchange Act to require
increased disclosure of acquisition and ownership information to the SEC, securities ex-
changes, and to the company itself. More troublesome is the requirement in § 103 of the Act
that reporting issuers institute a system of internal accounting controls to assure that man-
agement policies are being followed. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1977). This section
requires that a company "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls suffi-
cient to provide reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific au-
thorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial state-
ments in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria ap-
plicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at rea-
sonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences."
137. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-13346
(March 9, 1977).
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power to promulgate its own rules requiring independent audit com-
mittees for all issuers subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934
Exchange Act and the registration provisions of the 1933 Securities
Act.138 Even though no such rule has been adopted to date, the SEC
has been able to accomplish this goal indirectly by entering into con-
sent decrees in settlement of enforcement actions that have incorpo-
rated the independent audit committee requirement. 39 Such a
requirement forces changes in operating procedures that undoubtedly
will alter the substance of corporate transactions and governance. The
potential for direct impact of ancillary relief upon corporate govern-
ance in similar instances should not be underestimated. Accordingly,
in fashioning ancillary remedies the Commission and the courts should
be mindful of overstepping the appropriate boundaries of disclosure
and other forms of investor protection.
The Commission has been increasingly vigorous in seeking ancil-
lary remedies, 40 but its stated reasons for doing so have focused on
deterrence rather than the compensatory or remedial effects served.'
41
While to do otherwise might appear to depart from the securities acts'
injunctive design,' 42 increased emphasis on remedial effects by the
Commission is justifiable insofar as it would comport with the spirit of
both acts and the courts' equity powers. Accordingly, the current re-
strictive focus may be unnecessary. The Commission, in assuring in-
vestor protection, especially in disgorgement actions, should recognize
its remedial role. This change in emphasis both would deter future vio-
lations and compensate injured parties. 43 One commentator has sug-
138. Memorandum of General Counsel Harvey L. Pit to Chairman Williams (June 10,
1977), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,535 (1978).
139. E.g., Woods Corp., Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-15337 (Nov. 16, 1978);
Hycel, Inc., Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-14981 (July 20, 1978). But see SEC v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,583, at 94,473-
74 (D.D.C. 1978). See generaly Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2 CORP. L. REV. 91,113-14 (1979); Gam-
bling Corporation Settles Antifraud Action, Agrees to Establish Audit Committee, 515 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12 (July 23, 1979).
140. See Ellsworth, supra note 124, at 642 n.4.
141. "The Commission's primary function is to protect the public from fraudulent and
other unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals. Thus, a request
that disgorgement be required is predicated on the need to deprive defendants of profits
derived from their unlawful conduct and to protect the public by deterring such conduct by
others." 42 SEC Ai. REP. 108 (1976). This language has appeared in the SEC annual
reports since 1972. See Ellsworth, supra note 124, at 649 n.54. The emphasis on deterrence
dates back at least to 1968. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
142. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
143. One obvious problem with such a shift in objective from deterrence to compensa-
tion is the necessity that the Commission look beyond disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, as
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gested, however, that costs and other indicia of efficiency make the
SEC ill-suited for the task of acting as an investor advocate.144 In light
of the newly increased potential for the offensive use of collateral estop-
pel in private damage actions following SEC injunctive suits, 145 how-
ever, compensation issues have gained renewed importance. After a
brief discussion of the impact of the current trend toward SEC settle-
ments, the next sections of the Article analyze the potential for increas-
ing the aid to private litigants resulting from SEC proceedings.
Statutory changes needed to increase SEC efficiency while recognizing
the need for a compensatory remedy in securities regulation are then
discussed.
Settlement
In light of the time and effort involved in fully litigating an injunc-
tive suit, the SEC has become increasingly willing to accept out of court
settlements.' 46 Consent to an injunction has minimal impact because
the defendant, without admitting past violations, merely agrees not to
engage in the charged violations in the future. This impact is further
lessened because the collateral estoppel effect that might apply to a
fully litigated injunction order does not attach to a consent decree.
147
On the other hand, a consent injunction does have some deterrent ef-
fect, at least with respect to the defendants in a particular case; breach
of a settlement agreement or consent decree can result in criminal con-
tempt proceedings. The usefulness of this remedy should not be over-
estimated, however, as it requires a second SEC investigation and
prosecution, doubtlessly duplicating previous efforts.
The effectiveness of the injunction consent decree as an enforce-
such a fund may fall far short of compensating injured investors. See Ellsworth, supra note
124, at 651. For example, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), the court ordered disgorgement of insider profits derived from
purchasing stock prior to the public announcement of a significant mineral find. However,
such an order totally ignored investors who sold their stock in ignorance. Surely they suf-
fered more aggregate loss than the gain realized by the profiteering defendants. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(197 1); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Finan-
cial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 93,004 (D. Colo. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.
1973).
144. Ellsworth, supra note 124, at 651.
145. See text accompanying notes 148-87 infra.
146. See, e.g., SEC's Use of Settlements Still Solidly Supported by Majority of Commis-
sioners, 493 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (March 7, 1979). See text accompanying notes
110-11 supra.
147. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977). See notes 110-20 & accompanying text supra.
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ment device is increased to the extent that the Commission is willing to
insist upon the type of ancillary relief that would increase investor pro-
tection. As previously noted, there has been some movement in this
direction by the SEC and by the courts and a continuation of this trend,
both in the number of cases and types of remedies, is clearly warranted.
Consequently, the party under SEC investigation may fear both the
collateral estoppel effect of a judicially secured injunction and as the
imposition of ancillary relief by a court. This incentive to settle should
improve the SEC's position in negotiating a meaningful consent decree.
Indeed, unless the Commission strikes a hard bargain, an increase in
settlements portends nothing more than an easy way out for those
under threat of SEC suit.
The Role of the SEC in Private Suits
The Collateral Estoppel Effect of SEC Injunctions
A significant factor in favor of the vigorous pursuit of SEC injunc-
tions is the extent to which such suits can foster the compensatory and
deterrent goals of private rights of action. By stimulating private ac-
tions the SEC can achieve results that are largely absent in the typical
injunction decree. 148 The primary method by which SEC enforcement
actions can stimulate private suits is the offensive application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
An early impediment to private plaintiffs' offensive use of issues
previously litigated was the requirement of mutuality. 149 Later federal
decisions eliminated this requirement. 150 Also, until recently the courts
148. But see text accompanying notes 46-78 supra, discussing the availability of ancillary
relief in actions instituted by the Commission.
149. Under this doctrine the plaintiff would be entitled to collaterally estop the defend-
ant in a situation where the defendant could assert the collateral estoppel defense against the
plaintiff. However, because private plaintiffs are not parties to the prior SEC litigation, any
facts found contrary to their interests would have to be relitigated in the second suit lest they
be denied their day in court. See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1941); F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.26 (1965); lB J. MooRE & T. CURRIER, FED-
ERAL PRAcTICE 0,411(1) (2d ed. 1974); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301 (1961); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder
ofParties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968). Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-30 (1970) (reviewing mutuality of estoppel
doctrine but concluding estoppel could be pleaded when patentee seeks recovery for in-
fringement after patent declared invalid in separate action).
150. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181
F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America,
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had held uniformly that application of the doctrine could result in de-
nial of the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.' 5 The
Supreme Court, however, recently has explained in Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore152 that the application of many procedural developments
since 1791, including collateral estoppel, has diminished the scope of
the right to a jury trial without violating any seventh amendment
right. 153 The lifting of this barrier, however, does not pave a clear road
for easy application of collateral estoppel principles.
154
In the first instance, because of the potential unfairness involved in
the offensive use of collateral estoppel, the Court merely declared that
it would "grant trial courts broad discretion in determining when it
should be applied."' 155 Accordingly, in exercising this discretion courts
must balance the advantages gained by application of the doctrine
against possible prejudice to the defendant. The Parklane Hosiery de-
cision, although holding that no seventh amendment issue is involved,
necessarily leaves the jury issue open to consideration in evaluating un-
fairness to the defendant.
Perhaps the major potential unfairness is the risk that in defending
the SEC action the defendant did not litigate as vigorously as it would
have in a private action. In most SEC cases this should not be a major
obstacle, as even minor SEC injunctions can result in disability under
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See generally lB J. MOORE & I. CURRIER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 107 (Supp. 1978).
151. The right to a jury trial does not attach to an SEC enforcement action. Rachal v.
Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Cannon v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See, e.g., Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Edel-
stein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974); Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranson Print Works Co.,
453 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1972); McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D.
Cal. 1975). But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), aflg 565 F 2d 815
(2d Cir. 1977); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Standard Life Corp., 413 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Whitman Elec. Inc. v.
Local 363, 398 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Right to a
Jury Trial, 57 NEB. L. REV. 863 (1978). See generally Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of
Jury Trial in Civil Cases." A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1971); Com-
ment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private Damage Actions-Rachal v. Hill,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
152. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
153. Id at 333-35.
154. See Pickholz & Brodsky, An Assessment of Collateral Estoppel and SEC Enforce-
ment Proceedings After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 37 (1978).
155. 439 U.S. at 331. The Court cautioned that the potential for such unfairness should
not be underestimated. Id. at 330-3 1. See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311,
1322 (7th Cir. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977).
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the securities acts. 156 Furthermore, the publicity factor 57 involved in
SEC injunctive actions may force the defendant to defend vigor-
ously. 158 Notwithstanding the general proposition that such unfairness
will not ordinarily result, the trial judge must consider each case on an
ad hoc basis in exercising this broad discretion. As such, the extent to
which the vigor of the defense of a prior SEC suit stands as a barrier to
the offensive use of collateral estoppel can only be ascertained after
sufficient cases have been decided to present an identifiable pattern.
A second barrier to expansive application of collateral estoppel
that remains after the Supreme Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery is
the extent to which the elements of an SEC claim differ from that of a
private party. It is black letter law that collateral estoppel will preclude
relitigation only of those issues that not only are determined adversely
to the defendant in the first action, but also were necessary to support
the judgment. 159 With respect to the elements of any claimed violation,
the utility of collateral estoppel thus must vary with the substantive
violation at issue. Accordingly, the remainder of this section examines
the claims arising under those sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts that
provide a private remedy.
The major area of litigation in the antifraud realm derives from
the implied private remedies under Rule 10b-5's general proscrip-
tions,160 section 14(a)'s regulation of the proxy machinery, 161 section
156. For example, Regulation A's qualified small issue exemption from 1933 Act regis-
tration is expressly unavailable where the issuer, underwriter, any affiliate, or any individual
connected thereto has been subject to sanctions imposed under the securities acts. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.252(d)(3) (1978) (Rule 252(d)(3)). The rule also covers sanctions imposed by the Com-
mission in its adjudicatory function, such as stop orders. Id
157. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has identified adverse publicity as one of the "sanc-
tions" imposed by the SEC. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 446 (3d ed. 1972).
158. "Since one of the major functions of injunctive actions brought by the Commission
is the alerting of potential private plaintiffs to actionable violations of the securities laws, the
defendants should be well aware of the possibility of multiple private suits at a later date.
Thus, it is unlikely that the defendants would regard the injunction as unimportant and
therefore fail either to defend the first suit vigorously or to appeal an adverse judgment."
Comment, The Effect of SEC Injynctlions in Subsequent Private Damage Actions-Rachal v.
Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329, 1338-39 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See Shore v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 822 n.7 (2d Cir. 1977), affid, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See note 228 &
accompanying text infra. Significantly, both the publicity factor and the potential for disa-
bling penalties apply to administrative adjudications as well. See notes 206-10 & accompa-
nying text infra.
159. See generally IB J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.442[2]-[5] (2d
ed. 1974); A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA PRECLUSION V-246 to 56 (1969).
160. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1978). See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 (1967).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). See generally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State
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14(e)'s regulation of tender offers, 162 and the 1933 Act's general misrep-
resentation provision embodied in section 17(a).163 Despite its particu-
lar importance in private suits under Rule lOb-5, section 17(a), and
section 14(e), the standing issue 164 is not affected by prior SEC action.
In contrast, one question which pervades each of these sections is the
necessity of proving that the defendant acted with scienter. By virtue of
the holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder165 scienter is an element of a
Rule 1Ob-5 private damage claim. There is some authority to the effect
that scienter may not be required in actions brought under the proxy
rules 166 or under section 17(a), 167 but these issues have not yet been
definitively resolved. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder ex-
pressly left open the issue of whether scienter is an element to be
proved by the SEC when seeking injunctive relief under any of the
foregoing sections. 68 There has been much literature evaluating this
question, 169 but the majority of cases strongly favor not requiring scien-
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1960); Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actionsfor
Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). See generally Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, Standing to
Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams.Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1755 (1977); Note, Chris-Craft:
The Uncertain Evolution of Section 14(e), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 634 (1976).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule
10b-5 Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641
(1978).
164. Eg., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (competing tender offeror
lacks standing in a private damage suit under § 14(e)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (10b-5 damage suits can be brought only by one who purchased
or sold the securities in question); Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1977) (the
Blue Chip requirement does not apply in suits brought under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
165. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
166. Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). See Hazen, Corporate Chartering
and the Securities Markets. Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial
Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391, 426-28.
167. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,462
(2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (Ist Cir. 1976). But see
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
168. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
169. See generally Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Actions. .4 Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 769
(1976); Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Requiredfor SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5: .4 Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Maher & Blasi, Lessons
from Ernst & Ernst-Enforcement Proceedings and the Uncommon Law of lOb-5, 82 DICK. L.
REV. 1 (1977); Note, Scienter and Injunctive Relief Under Rule l0b-5, 11 GA. L. REV. 879
(1977); Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5:
The Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977); Note, Scienter and SEC Injunctive
Actions Under Securities Act Section 17(a), 63 IOWA L. REV. 1248 (1978); Note, New Light on
an Old Debate: Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L.
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ter in SEC injunctive actions. 170 Assuming this trend continues, and
the SEC is not required to establish scienter while private parties must,
the collateral estoppel effect of at least Rule lOb-5 enforcement actions
will be severely curtailed.' 71 Of course, questions of whether there was
a material misstatement or omission would be the same in both the
SEC and private actions, but the elements of reliance, causation, and
damages would not be, as the SEC is concerned with the general invest-
ing public rather than specific injuries. On the other hand, the availa-
bility of ancillary relief in the SEC action 72 may depend upon showing
a specific injury to identifiable investors and may require a showing of
scienter.173 Thus, absent a request for ancillary relief, the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts do not appear to present opportu-
nities for extensive use of offensive collateral estoppel.
The effect of prior SEC action may be much more significant in
private actions brought under the express liability provisions of both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Section 11 of the 1933 Act174 provides a pri-
vate remedy for any purchaser of a registered security when the regis-
tration statement contains material misstatements or omissions.
175
Although the issuer is "absolutely" liable, the defenses of "due dili-
gence" and "reasonable investigation" are available to all other de-
fendants, effectively creating a negligence standard as to them.176 To
the extent that an SEC action results in a finding of misleading infor-
REv. 759 (1977); Note, SEC Injunctive Actions: A Negligence Standard Under Rule 10Jb-5, 28
SYRACUSE L. REv. 763 (1977).
170. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v.
Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d
1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1977); SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co.,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See notes
167, 169 supra. See also SEC v. Aaron, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800 (2d Cir.
1979). But see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
171. The proposed Federal Securities Code would impose no more than a negligence
standard in SEC enforcement actions. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1602(a), Comment (3) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1978).
172. See text accompanying notes 123-45 supra.
173. Id See generally Ellsworth, supra note 124; Note, SEC Injunctive and Ancillary
Relief Under Rule lOb-5: A Scienter Requirement?, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 872.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
175. Id Liability under this section extends to the issuer, directors, partners, signers of
the registration statement, and persons who have helped prepare the statement, as well as all
underwriters.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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mation in a registration statement, collateral estoppel would enable the
plaintiff to prevail against issuers merely by proving that he or she
purchased the securities. As for the liability of other defendants, pri-
vate litigants suing under section 11 would face the same problems as
those suing under Rule lOb-5, with the exception that the plaintiff need
not prove reliance or a causal connection to the damages suffered.
177
Even less difficult to establish than the section 11 claim is a private
suit under section 12(l),178 which provides that any person who sells a
security in violation of the 1933 Act's registration or prospectus re-
quirements 79 shall be liable for rescission and damages. A section
12(1) suit requires no showing of causation or actual damage and is
used to redress even mere technical violations. 80 Here the only fact a
private plaintiff must prove after a successful SEC enforcement action
is the purchase of the security. Consequently, the collateral estoppel
effect in section 12(1) claims would be substantially greater than in
Rule lOb-5 suits.
The third express liability provision of the 1933 Act, section
12(2),181 provides an antifraud remedy to any purchaser in privity with
the violator, who is held to a negligence standard. 8 2 The differences
between section 12(2)'s privity requirement and negligence standard
and rule lOb-5's requirement of reliance, causation, and actual dam-
ages are so substantial as effectively to provide the defendant in an
SEC suit with the opportunity for a second complete defense in any
subsequent private litigation.
In contrast to some of the 1933 Act provisions, the express liability
provisions of the 1934 Act do not provide an effective basis for the use
of collateral estoppel. Section 9(e) prohibits market manipulation and
provides a private remedy for "willful" violations-a standard which
would appear on its face to embody more of an actual intent require-
ment than does mere scienter. 8 3 Section 16(b) provides for disgorge-
ment of insider short-swing profits, but the SEC does not exercise
177. Section 11 (e) spells out the measure of damages. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(1) (1976).
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
180. See Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Dishkin v. Lomasney & Co.,
452 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 839 (4th ed. 1977); Loss, supra note 31, at 1692-1998.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976). See generally Peterson, Recent Developments in Civil Lia-
bility Under Section 12(2) ofthe Securities Act of 1933, 5 Hous. L. REV. 274 (1967).
182. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 840-41 (4th ed. 1977).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
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enforcement power in such situations. 84 Finally, section 18(a) affords
relief for an investor who relies on misleading documents filed with the
SEC when the defendant has acted knowingly or in bad faith.18 5 In
addition to its express fault requirement, however, section 18(a) has an
express reliance requirement, rendering an SEC initiated adjudication
of a misleading filing of limited effect.
In light of the limited utility of sections 9(e) and 18(a), 186 pursuit
of SEC actions under the 1934 Act seems of little use to private plain-
tiffs. Similarly, even with respect to the more heavily litigated an-
tifraud actions under Rule lOb-5 and section 14(a), the primary aid of a
successful SEC injunction would be to establish a misstatement or
omission and materiality. However, these are issues which frequently
may be appropriate for partial summary judgment in the private
suit.18 7 Under the 1933 Act, the successful SEC injunction may be
somewhat more helpful in private suits under sections 11 and 12(2), but
its real utility lies in section 12(1) rescission actions.
The foregoing demonstrates that, even in the most favorable light
the efficacy of SEC injunctive suits as an aid to private parties is mini-
mal, particularly when the costs to the SEC are considered. This in-
ability to aid private parties, when coupled with the limitations as a
public enforcement tool discussed previously, cast considerable doubt
upon the desirability of pursuing injunctive relief. In addition, these
actions drain the resources of the SEC and add to the overflow of busy
court dockets. One way to preserve this function of the SEC and im-
prove its efficiency would be to remove these cases from the courts and
put them before the SEC sitting in its adjudicatory capacity.
The Collateral Estoppel Effect of SEC Agency Adjudications
As previously noted, the current statutory scheme empowers the
SEC, sitting in its adjudicatory capacity, to impose a broad range of
sanctions against issuers subject to the registration and reporting re-
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See generally Hazen, The New.Pragmatism Under Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1975).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). But see Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1977).
186. It has been observed that "section 9(e) has been swallowed by Rule lOb-5 and
Section 18(a) has been completely supplanted by the implied actions under Section 14 and
other sections." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATER-
IALS 872 (4th ed. 1977) (footnote omitted).
187. The absence of a scienter requirement in private suits under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act
and § 14 of the 1934 Act, of course, would make the prior SEC determination more signifi-
cant. However, this aspect of the scienter issue has not yet been resolved. See text accompa-
nying notes 165-73 supra.
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quirements, broker-dealers, members of self-regulatory organizations,
and national exchanges.1 88 In addition, the Commission has similar
power with respect to investment companies' 89 and investment advi-
sors. 190 Commonly, many of these administrative adjudicatory pro-
ceedings involve violations of substantive sections that also give rise to
private remedies. The effect of an adverse agency determination in a
subsequent court action for private relief thus warrants some investiga-
tion.
The Supreme Court's approach in its recent Parklane Hosiery de-
cision, when read in conjunction with agency adjudication decisions,
offers a great opportunity for the offensive use of collateral estoppel by
a private party. As noted earlier, the benchmark of the Parklane Ho-
siery opinion was to give the trial court a broad range of discretion,
remaining mindful of the potential unfairness of offensive estoppel. 191
In a recent pre-Parklane Hosiery decision, the Seventh Circuit in Bowen
v. United States'92 examined the effect of a prior administrative adjudi-
cation. The court held that facts found in an administrative license
suspension proceeding before the National Transportation Safety
Board against a pilot were to be given collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent civil damage action brought by him. Although in Bowen
collateral estoppel was used against the pilot to bar his claim, 193 the
principles announced therein bear on the offensive use of prior SEC
agency proceedings.
The chief objection to applying collateral estoppel in Bowen was
the difference between an agency adjudication and a complete judicial
determination. The Seventh Circuit, however, pointed to the well-es-
tablished rule that agency adjudication will operate as res judicata in
subsequent judicial proceedings. 194 It relied on the reasoning of Pro-
188. See notes 31-45 & accompanying text supra.
189. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-37(a), 80a-39 (1976).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 l(a), (c) (1976).
191. See text accompanying notes 155-59 supra.
192. 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior Court, 18 Ariz. App.
287, 501 P.2d 463 (1972) (use of defensive estoppel based on prior administrative audit). In
the labor law context, collateral estoppel has long been applied to give force to a prior
NLRB finding of unfair labor practices. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEV-
ENTIES 428 (1976). But see Bryant v. L.H. Moore Canning Co., 509 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974).
193. In the administrative proceeding the pilot was found to have violated Federal Avia-
tion Regulations, which in the second action was found to be negligence per se, thus pre-
cluding his recovery because of contributory negligence. 570 F.2d at 1319-20.
194. Id at 1320-21. The court traced the growth of administrative res judicata from
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), and its expansion in both
the federal and state courts. 570 F.2d at 1321 n.27. See generally 2 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRA-
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fessor Davis, who twenty years earlier suggested that, where appropri-
ate, the doctrine should be applied in the administrative context
because the underlying policies of res judicata can apply with equal
force to a prior agency determination. 95 After noting the acceptance
of Professor Davis' reasoning amongst the judiciary, the Seventh Cir-
cuit recommended that "the courts have not hesitated in recent years to
expand the application of collateral estoppel . . . to better serve the
underlying policy on which the doctrine is based, viz., that one oppor-
tunity'to litigate an issue fully and fairly is enough."' 196 Recognizing
that agency adjudication procedures are less formal and the rules of
evidence are relaxed, the court nevertheless concluded that this test had
been met. 197 Additionally, the court placed a heavy emphasis upon the
fact that the administrative sanction-suspension of a license-was a
significant one, and that there had been a vigorous defense including
the presence of counsel at the agency level.' 98
All of the foregoing factors are equally present in SEC administra-
tive hearings. Because suspension or license revocation of broker-deal-
ers, exchanges, investment companies, and investment advisors, stop
orders on 1933 Act registration statements, and suspension of trading
or delisting under the 1934 Act are possible sanctions, a defendant is
likely to pursue a case vigorously. 199 Even the less severe SEC sanc-
tions can have significant adverse results on the defendant.
200
Taking the Bowen rationale, the approach of the Supreme Court
in Parklane Hosiery would appear to foreshadow expansion of the of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel based on a prior administrative adju-
dication. A significant difference here, in contrast to the judicially
imposed SEC injunction, is that the potential for unfairness is in-
creased by the differences in agency and court procedures. This in turn
may render trial judges less likely to exercise the discretion identified in
Parklane Hosiery. In light of the standard of proof and procedural
safeguards afforded the defendant in SEC proceedings, 201 however, the
TIVE LAw TREATISE § 18.02 (1st ed. 1958 & Supp. 1976); Note, The CollateralEstoppel Effect
of .4dministrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 65
(1977).
195. 570 F.2d at 1321 (quoting 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.02
(Ist ed. 1958)). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1942) (underlying principles of final-
ity).
196. 570 F.2d at 1322.
197. Id
198. Id at 1323.
199. See notes 46-78 & accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 46-78 & accompanying text supra and note 156 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
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claim of unfairness may not succeed. As in a prior SEC injunction suit,
the standard of proof may differ when compared with a private damage
action; however, this issue is yet to be resolved. In fact, the suggestion
has been made that scienter may be a necessary element before the
Commission can impose sanctions.
20 2
Whatever the future may hold in this regard, collateral estoppel in
private damage suits based on prior SEC adjudication may become a
significant factor. To the extent that the Commission continues to re-
quire a showing of willfulness for the more severe sanctions, collateral
estoppel may be more of a real threat in administrative adjudication
than in an SEC injunction suit. As the potential for the offensive use of
collateral estoppel becomes more apparent, a shift toward the increased
use of administrative rather than judicial adjudication would be war-
ranted. By decreasing the caseload in the more time-consuming in-
junction suits, the Commission would be able to productively redirect
those efforts without denying important benefits to private plaintiffs.
The discussion so far has been directed toward collateral estoppel
and SEC sanctions as they currently are enforced. To the extent that
administrative adjudicatory power is expanded to consider many of the
violations now reserved for judicial proceedings,20 3 the utility of collat-
eral estoppel necessarily will increase. Thus, from the standpoint of
SEC efficiency, it would seem preferable to severely limit the judicial
injunction remedy 2°4 while retaining the possible collateral estoppel ef-
fect of administrative adjudications.
20 5
Other Roles for the SEC in Private Litigation
Collateral estoppel is far from the only means by which the com-
mission can aid private litigants. An obvious additional means would
be SEC intervention into private suits. Short of direct intervention the
SEC may submit amicus briefs. Although the Commission currently
submits such briefs, it does not do so primarily to aid particular private
202. See, e.g., Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1978). The Commission requires
willful conduct before it will impose the more severe sanctions. E.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(A) (1976). See, e.g., Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
203. See notes 256-68 & accompanying text infra.
204. See notes 256-68 & accompanying text infra.
205. If, however, the SEC is given cease and desist powers rather than increased sanc-
tioning power, collateral estoppel would be less significant, as the guidelines of Bowen and
Parklane Hosiery would not allow summary proceedings to be the basis for applying the
doctrine. See text accompanying notes 256-58 infra.
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plaintiffs, 20 6 but rather to establish beneficial precedent from the per-
spective of investor protection. This motivation behind allocation of
limited agency resources certainly is consistent with the SEC's current
focus on deterrence as opposed to compensation. Moreover, although
this emphasis necessarily restricts the number and type of private suits
in which the Commission will appear, such limitations seem reasonable
in view of the limited resources currently available to the Commission.
Another possible role for the Commission having a broad impact
on the resolution of private disputes would be for the SEC to act as the
adjudicating authority. This type of adjudicatory power, although be-
yond the current statutory scope of SEC authority, is a legitimate use of
an administrative body207 and can be supported in principle on various
grounds. The primary justification would be the high degree of exper-
tise that SEC adjudication would bring to the resolution of private dis-
putes. In addition to being expensive and protracted, private securities
litigation can be exceedingly complex. Lengthy opinions and findings
of fact are common to such cases. 20 8 Courts have even gone so far as to
refuse a party's jury demand because of the complexity of the issues
involved.209 Furthermore, the costs of judicial litigation often preclude
prosecution of small claims. SEC adjudication of private disputes
would be of particular significance to such plaintiffs.
Use of SEC expertise in fact finding and arbitration of disputes
certainly would expedite the resolution of private securities litigation,
but also would call for a significant increase in administrative person-
nel. As noted previously, current budgetary restraints might not be
conducive to an expansion resulting in increased bureaucracy. More-
over, the magnitude of most securities claims belies reference to admin-
istrative rather than judicial adjudication. For this reason, and in view
of the already expansive role of the SEC, this alternative for reform
does not appear to be viable.
206. By the close of the 1971 fiscal year the Commission had participated as amicus
curiae or intervenor in approximately 350 cases. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 227 (1971). From fiscal
year 1972 through 1976 the Commission participated in approximately 62 additional cases.
38 SEC ANN. REP. 170 (1972); 39 SEC ANN. RP. 170 (1973); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 90-93
(1974); 41 SEC ANN. REP. 209 (1975); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 206 (1976). The Commission
participates when it considers it important to present its views on the proper interpretation
of the provisions involved. Such participation is usually at the appellate level. 40 SEC ANN.
REP. 90 (1974).
207. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
208. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), a'g 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
209. In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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Perhaps the most effective, as well as the least expensive, SEC ac-
tivity is its publicity function.210 This may be one of the most underes-
timated tools available to the Commission. The potential of adverse
publicity flowing from an SEC investigation has a significant deterrent
effect. Public awareness of such investigations cannot avoid injuring
the reputation and goodwill of broker-dealers. Also, because they in-
still a lack of investor confidence, SEC investigations can have adverse
effects on the price of publicly traded securities. A second aspect of the
publicity function is that it alerts investors to the existence of possible
private remedies. A disgruntled investor who hears of an SEC investi-
gation may be spurred to consult an attorney, which in turn may well
result in a successful suit for damages.
To the extent that desired deterrent effects and remedial results
derive from SEC publicity, further administrative proceedings should
be closely scrutinized. If much of the desired effect of an SEC injunc-
tive suit may be accomplished prior to the filing of a complaint by pub-
licity, full litigation is a waste of administrative resources. Just as the
Commission currently issues litigation releases, it could expand the
publicity function by issuing investigation releases which would dis-
close information discovered during the course of its investigation, sub-
ject to the boundaries of confidential information. Although there
could be no adjudication of guilt, the charges could be aired publicly.
Section 21(a) of the 1934 Act expressly authorizes such public re-
ports.21' To date, however, this power to issue public reports has not
been utilized to its optimal extent.212 In fact, section 21(a) has formed
the basis of much recent controversy. In In re Spartek, Inc.,2l3 the
Commission issued a section 21(a) report of a staff investigation includ-
ing the acceptance of the registrant's offer of settlement. Commissioner
Karmel vigorously dissented, considering the report to be in excess of
the SEC's jurisdiction.21 4 She reasoned that the publicity function
could not properly be used as an alternative to SEC enforcement ac-
tions. 215 Nonetheless, the SEC has since used the publicity function in
210. See 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 9, ch. 5.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976).
212. See BNA Interview: Pollack Questions Advisability of Passing Federal Securities
Code at this Time, 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-l (Jan. 3, 1979).
213. 491 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 (February 21, 1979).
214. Id at E-4.
215. "1 object to the use of Section 21(a) as an alternative administrative remedy against
persons who allegedly violate the securities laws. In particular, it should not be used to take
administrative action against persons not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under
Section 15 of the Exchange Act. I object even more strenuously to the use of Section 21(a) as
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this manner.216 Additionally, the SEC has issued a statement of prac-
tice supporting the use of section 21(a) reports and asserting that
"where it appears to be in the public interest" settlement statements
given to the Commission should be submitted "with the expectation
that the Commission may make the statements public."217 Once again
Commissioner Karmel voiced her objection, pointing, inter alia, to pos-
sible due process objections:
The Commission also has authority under Section 21(a) to pub-
lish information concerning violations of the Act, as long as the re-
quirements of procedural due process are satisfied. Publication may
be utilized to support rulemaking, to form a basis for legislative pro-
posals, or to aid in enforcement of provisions of the Act.
The practice announced today relates solely to enforcement
matters. However, in the absence of Commission authorization of a
proceeding specified in the Act, I believe that publication of the type
of statement involved here would be appropriate only if the Commis-
sion reasonably believes the admitted conduct may violate the securi-
ties laws and if the publication would serve to avoid undue harm to
investors or the trading markets, or to achieve some other similar
articulated public purpose. Because the majority has not so limited
the basis for publication of this type of statement, it has, in my opin-
ion, carved out not only a new practice but also a new administrative
an enforcement vehicle to publicize facts which do not constitute violations of the securities
laws. The Commission has express statutory provisions under which it must proceed to
determine whether violations have occurred and what sanctions should be imposed. Once
those findings are made, the Commission then may publish information about these viola-
tions under Section 21(a) for the purposes enumerated therein. Using Section 21(a) instead
of invoking express statutory procedures I believe is improper.
"The Commission could have instituted an injunctive action based on the facts set forth
in the opinion of the majority. If the public interest were not sufficient to warrant such
action, the matter could have been resolved informally by the filing of adequate definitive
proxy materials by Spartek. Spartek's preliminary proxy materials were never disseminated.
The Commission's failure to have the necessary authority to correct the perceived problems
with respect to the preliminary proxy materials and Cable's statements to exchange officials
involved here in an administrative proceeding may be due to the accidents of legislative
drafting. I recognize there is a strong public policy which favors both the settlement of cases
and the utilization of creative procedures by a regulatory agency to fulfill a statutory man-
date. Nevertheless, I do not believe that prosecutorial discretion should be exercised by
choosing an administrative course not set forth by statute.
"If the Commission does not have adequate remedies for handling cases like this under
the present law, it should request further authority from the Congress. The implication of
new remedies by a government agency is not an appropriate way to vindicate or develop the
law." Id at E-5 (footnotes omitted).
216. E.g., Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-15746, 500 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
A-24 (April 25, 1979); In re Marine Protein Corp. Indus. Dev. Revenue Bonds, 499 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 (April 18, 1979); Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-15665,
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,015 (March 21, 1979).
217. Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-15664, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,014 at 81,557-58 (March 21, 1979) (footnote omitted).
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remedy.
218
In response, the majority of the Commission pointed out that this was
not a new administrative sanction, because a section 21(a) report is in-
dependent of and could not preclude an enforcement action.
219
If section 21(a) reports are to be adopted on a more frequent basis,
fairness would dictate that those subject to such reports be given an
equal opportunity to publicly refute the charges. It is not suggested
that this type of publicity be a complete substitute for injunctive suits,
or for administrative sanctions. Rather, the injunction remedy and ad-
ministrative sanction should still be available to further interests other
than publicity and thus still be viable remedies in many instances.
Significantly, the effect of SEC activity upon injured investors is
but one factor to consider in evaluating the proper scope of Commis-
sion activity. Although significant, especially in light of the impact of
private remedies, it is but one aspect of the overall regulatory picture.
As valuable as the private remedy may be, it should not detract from
the importance of the various roles of the SEC, including enforcement
and deterrence.
Alternatives for the Future
The Enforcement Provisions of the Proposed Federal Securities Code
In February, 1979, after more than ten years of work and six tenta-
tive drafts, the seventh and final draft of Professor Louis Loss' Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code was adopted by the American Law
Institute.220 The changes to SEC administration and enforcement
which would be effectuated through enactment of the code have been
described as "substantial," 22' yet the proposed reforms are essentially
procedural in nature. These provisions would improve the current
scheme, but they do not reach many of the problems discussed herein.
More specifically, the proposed code would retain the SEC's basic
method of operation while expanding the Commission's express statu-
tory authority to work within that framework.
The code would give the SEC comprehensive rulemaking author-
ity.22 2 This is similar to the present approach insofar as the code allows
218. Id at 81,558 (footnote omitted).
219. Id at 81,558 n.6.
220. For a more comprehensive discussion of an earlier draft of those provisions see
Mathews, supra note 115.
221. Id at 466. See also A.L.i Proposed Federal Securities Code.- A Program, in 34 Bus.
LAW. 345, 371-76 (1978).
222. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1804(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
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for both general interpretive rules and rules expressly delegated by the
code's substantive provisions.
Earlier drafts of the proposed code contained an express statutory
grant of power to discipline and suspend attorneys and other "profes-
sionals" from practicing before the Commission.223 As noted previ-
ously, although the SEC currently exercises this power under Rule of
Practice 2(e), there is no explicit statutory authority for the practice.
224
Although a solid statutory basis for the SEC's disciplinary power would
be advantageous, the proposal was more limited than the expansive
wording of the current rule.225 These earlier drafts would not have al-
lowed for the disciplining of officers, directors, and others who would
not qualify as "professionals" under the proposed code. The final draft
adopted by the Institute, however, has deleted this section, thereby
"neither enlarging nor diminishing whatever implicit authority the
Commission has."' 226 Accordingly, the code would not preclude ex-
panding the current scope of SEC activity in this area.
In the administrative portion of the proposed code, there are pro-
visions specifically identifying and spelling out the SEC's investigatory
powers. A significant change from the present statute is that the new
code would distinguish between private, enforcement oriented investi-
gations and those involving public, quasi-legislative inquiries. 227 While
not expanding the scope of investigations relating to issuers and bro-
ker-dealers, the code identifies the manner in which investigations can
be conducted. As is the case under the present statutory framework,
enforcement oriented investigations could result in administrative pro-
ceedings before the Commission, 228 SEC initiated injunction suits,229 or
criminal prosecution.230 The proposed code also details the Commis-
sion's investigatory authority and the available methods of information
gathering.231
A significant limitation under the proposed code is that it contains
223. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1502(a)(5) (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974). See generally Ma-
thews, supra note 115, at 476.
224. See notes 79-103 & accompanying text supra.
225. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1978).
226. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1804, Explanatory Note 2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
See notes 86-87 & accompanying text supra.
227. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1806(a)-(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
228. Id §§ 1808-1809.
229. Id § 1819(a).
230. Id § 1821.
231. The Commission would have the power to require answers to interrogatories in the
course of enforcement investigations, id § 1806(c); subpoena power, id § 1806(e); and visi-
torial authority, id § 1806(g). See generally Mathews, supra note 115, at 482-90.
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a more narrow publicity power than currently exists under section 21 (a)
of the 1934 Act. 232 Except in the quasi-legislative investigations, the
Commission would not be given publicity power.2 33 Although this
would place limits on the publicity function, it also would protect
against undue public probing. On the other hand, the proposed code's
restriction on publicity in enforcement investigations may only apply to
ongoing investigations. Thus, it might not preclude the public an-
nouncement of results of investigations, as was suggested earlier, as one
way of improving SEC efficiency and efficacy.
234
Following the pattern of the current statutory scheme, under the
proposed code the Commission would be given administrative quasi-
adjudicatory authority over both issuers235 and securities profession-
als.236 The code would require registration of all issuers with at least
one million dollars in total assets and five hundred holders of nonex-
empt securities. 237 Section 1808 of the proposed code would give the
Commission a wide range of sanctioning powers over such issuers, in-
cluding the issuance of compliance orders,238 stop orders, 239 suspen-
sions of the privilege of using the summary prospectus, 240 and
suspension or termination of listing privileges.
241
Again following the current pattern, the SEC would have sanc-
tioning power against securities professionals who are subject to the
code's registration provisions.242 Section 1809 would provide a broad
range of sanctions including the denial, suspension, or revocation of
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976). See text accompanying notes 211-12 supra.
233. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1806(b), (d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978). The code ex-
pressly provides for a right of reply by any person or entity subject to adverse publicity. Id.
§ 1806(d)(3).
234. See notes 210-19 & accompanying text supra.
235. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1808 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
236. Id. § 1809.
237. In addition, others may subject themselves voluntarily to the registration provi-
sions. Id § 402. This provision somewhat expands the current statute, which requires five
hundred holders of any class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78 1(g)(1) (1976). The pro-
posed code's provisions on distributions does not require a new registration but does provide
for the filing of an offering statement and imposes prospectus requirements. ALI FED. SEC.
CODE §§ 502-515 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978). See generally Bialkin, The Issuer Registra-
tion and Distribution Provisions of the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV.
327 (1977).
238. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1808(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
239. Id § 1808(d).
240. Id § 1808(0.
241. Id § 1808(g).
242. Part VII of the code deals with the registration of brokers, dealers and advisers. Id
§§ 701-706.
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registration,243 censure either privately or publicly,244 and the barring
of association with individuals who violate the code.2 45 The same pat-
tern would apply to adjudication of violations by members of self-regu-
latory organizations.2
46
The new code deals with the SEC's administrative rulemaking and
adjudicatory power procedurally, leaving the substance of the present
arrangement basically unchanged. 247 Most striking is that the Commis-
sion would have broad powers to disqualify or suspend individuals
from association with brokers, dealers, underwriters, investment advi-
sors, investment companies, banks, or insurance companies. 248 Like
the present regulatory scheme, however, there would be no comparable
power over issuers and persons associated with them.
249
The third area of SEC authority-as enforcer in the courts-
would not be dramatically altered by the code. The Commission's abil-
ity to seek injunctive relief in the courts would not differ significantly
from current practice. Section 1819 tracks the provisions of the current
statutes. 250 The only exception is that the code would give express stat-
utory authority for ancillary relief:
In an action created by or based on a violation of this Code, whether
or not brought by the Commission, the court has the authority of a
court of equity to grant appropriate ancillary or other relief, includ-
ing an injunction, an accounting, a receivership of the defendant or
the defendant's assets, disgorgement of profits, and restitution
243. Id § 1809.
244. Id
245. Id § 1809(b)-(c).
246. Id § 1810. Part VIII of the code is concerned with SEC oversight of such organiza-
tions. Id §§ 801-810.
247. See note 12 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of the dichotomy between
agency procedure and the subject matter of the regulation.
248. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1809(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
249. Such sanctions, however, may be judicially imposed by way of ancillary relief in a
civil injunction action. See text accompanying notes 123-45 supra. See ALI FED. SEC.
CODE § 1819(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) (quoted at text accompanying note 251 in-
fra).
250. "The Commission may bring an action to enjoin a violation of, or to enforce com-
pliance with, this Code or the rules of a national securities exchange or registered securities
association of which the defendant is a member or an associate of a member or a registered
clearing agency in which the defendant is a participant.
"On a showing that the defendant has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in acts
or practices constituting such a violation, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that he
will engage, or will continue to engage, in such acts or practices unless enjoined, the court
shall grant appropriate relief in the form of temporary or permanent restraining orders and
injunctions and orders enforcing compliance." Id §§ 1819(a)(1),(3). See generally Ma-
thews, supra note 115, at 534-49.
November 1979] SEC ENFORCEMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
251
The statute would defer to current case law and practice to deter-
mine the nature of such ancillary relief as this power is based on the
same inherent equity authority that the SEC and the courts look to
presently.25 2 One difference would be extension of the availability of
ancillary relief to private litigants and to the SEC in criminal proceed-
ings. Seemingly, insofar as the SEC is charged with enforcement, its
ability to secure far reaching remedies would exceed that of private
litigants whose interests are tied to the particular issues of the private
controversy before the court.253 The availability of ancillary remedies
in criminal proceedings, however, would further the same ends as in
SEC injunction suits.
With respect to the proposed code's provisions for criminal prose-
cution,254 the changes are directed primarily to the requisite standards
of knowledge and corresponding penalties. These are issues which
have also been considered in connection with recent changes in the fed-
eral criminal code.255 Once more, the differences in the proposed stat-
ute are not particularly significant with respect to the ultimate question
of the scope of enforcement activity under the securities acts.
In sum, the essence of the proposed code's changes in the SEC's
administrative role is procedural. These changes are well taken and
may be most helpful in eliminating some of the deficiencies of the cur-
rent law. The common thread giving express authority for many of the
practices now followed by the Commission would lend more certainty
to the basis of SEC power. Yet these statutory provisions could have
the effect of providing less flexibility in the use of enforcement tech-
niques. Certainly this is a balance which must be struck. The code,
however, seems to go too far in restricting flexibility. The chief defi-
ciency of the proposed code in this area is its failure to clarify the role
of the SEC injunction and other enforcement techniques based on effi-
ciency and the potential long term effects on the investing public. Al-
though many of the reforms suggested herein with respect to the
251. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1819(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
252. See notes 123-45 & accompanying text supra.
253. As is the case with all of § 1819, to the extent that the private litigant's ability to
secure ancillary relief is based on judicial equity power, this provision of the code would
seem to add nothing to the present enforcement scheme.
254. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1821 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978).
255. See id §§ 1821(e)-1821(f), Note at 700. See also ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1517(a),
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 3 1974); Mathews, supra note 115, at 549-69; Mathews & Sulli-
van, Criminal Liabililyfor Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: The National Commis-
sion's Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S, 1, and S. 1400, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (1973).
[Vol. 31
current acts also would be applicable and consistent with the language
of the proposed code, any amendment to the current law should in-
clude such changes expressly.
Other Alternatives and Summary of Recommendations
After seriously questioning the advisability of the proposed code,
SEC Commissioner Irving Pollack suggested the possibility of vesting
the Commission with cease and desist power.256 Giving the SEC such
summary authority would be a significant expansion of its current ad-
judicatory authority. Cease and desist power would promote the more
expeditious resolution of the compliance suits that are now left to SEC
injunctive actions. The use of such summary power against issuers sub-
ject to the 1933 and 1934 Acts would increase the Commission's ability
to prevent continuing violations. On the other hand, the SEC's power
to issue stop orders and refusal orders under the 1933 Act,257 and its
summary suspension power under the 1934 Act,258 afford many of the
benefits of cease and desist power. Also, the provisions governing ex-
changes,259 broker-dealers,26 and self-regulatory organizations, 26' give
similar power over securities professionals. In essence, cease and desist
power would be a significant weapon only to the extent that it covered
persons other than those already subject to the 1934 Act's licensing pro-
visions.
An alternative expansion of SEC enforcement authority would be
to increase the Commission's role either as an adjudicator of private
disputes or as an investor advocate in terms of parenspatriae power.
As with cease and desist power, this would increase the strain on SEC
resources, yet it could provide an important benefit in certain situa-
tions. Many securities violations involve sufficiently large scale trans-
256. BNA Interview: Pollack Questions Advisability of Passing Federal Securities Code
at this Time, 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-1 (Jan. 3, 1979). The best example of
cease and desist power is found in the FTC which effectively can issue its own prohibitory
injunction or compliance order without having to go to court. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (West
Supp. 1979). Commissioner Pollack noted that this would be an extreme measure for the
SEC and indicated a preference for strengthening SEC injunctive relief in the courts. Com-
missioner Pollack, however, has gathered support for this proposed cease and desist power.
See Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunctions: It's Time to Give the Commission an Adainis-
trative Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 345 (1979). See also The SEC Speaks in
1979: Panelists Focus on Self-Regulation, the Courts, Future Trends, 493 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) A-17 (Mar. 7, 1979).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1976).
258. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1976).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
261. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976).
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actions to provide incentives for injured investors to bring suit. But
what about the small investor? Consider, for example, the broker who
invests an individual's ten thousand dollar life savings and because of
churning and improper investment advice the account dwindles to
nothing. Unsophisticated investors are easy prey for brokers, especially
when there is little threat of private enforcement as a result of the ex-
pense of litigating a securities case. Of course NASD and SEC sanc-
tions are available, but limitations on resources make investigation and
prosecution of such small scale acitivity unlikely.
There are two alternatives for increasing the chances of restitution
to the small investor. The first would be to establish the SEC as an
adjudicator of small disputes. Setting a maximum jurisdictional dollar
limit on such SEC adjudicatory authority would give the small investor
a remedy and at the same time leave the larger cases to the courts
where full litigation is economically feasible. This increased adjudica-
tory power would go beyond compensating injured investors as it
would provide a deterrent against the proscribed activity. In essence,
private claimants would provide the Commission with sufficient facts
to institute administrative sanctions against the offender, thus adding to
the SEC's enforcement power. Needless to say, this type of reform
would require congressional action. A slight variation of this proposal
would be to delegate this small claim adjudicatory function to a self-
regulatory organization such as the NASD or to the national ex-
changes. Although this delegation would cover most broker-dealers, it
would not extend to a large number of issuers subject to SEC jurisdic-
tion but not listed on a national exchange.
The second alternative for dealing with small claims would be to
have the Commission bring suit on the investor's behalf. This is the
ideal avenue for the expansion of ancillary relief. Although not requir-
ing statutory amendment, this approach has drawbacks. In the first in-
stance, the violation in question would have to be of sufficient
magnitude and concern to the general investing public to warrant SEC
investigation and enforcement. It simply would not be economically
feasible to siphon off the Commission's resources by dealing with every
small claim. Secondly, the injunctive provisions of the statutes limit
such actions to cases where there is the serious threat of future viola-
tions. 26
2
Shifting the SEC injunction action to administrative adjudication
262. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976). See note 118 supra; see text accompanying notes
119-20 supra.
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would decrease the relative costs of such Commission enforcement ac-
tivity but would still require an enormous expenditure of SEC re-
sources to investigate and prosecute all cases where small investors
have been injured. Either administrative or judicial enforcement
would leave few SEC resources for investigation and prosecution of
larger cases.
With respect to the securities acts violations occurring within the
context of large scale transactions, private suits are more economical.
Thus, the increased use of the Commission's publicity power to alert
potential private plaintiffs263 would be of significant benefit, as would
the expansion of the collateral estoppel effect of SEC injunction
suits.264 It would be in this area of enforcement that amplification of
SEC adjudicatory and sanctioning power might be most helpful.
Moreover, to the extent that the Commission relies on current adminis-
trative sanctions, leaving injunctive suits to more appropriate cases,
statutory amendment is not necessary. This is especially true in dis-
pensing sanctions under its licensing authority, as the Commission
could expand its impact significantly by using ancillary relief. Addi-
tionally, the availability of ancillary remedies in the settlement proc-
ess265 significantly increases the SEC's potential effectiveness.
The final method of increasing SEC efficiency would be the expan-
sion of the administrative sanctioning power. As noted earlier, al-
though the SEC has licensing power over issuers under both the 1933
and 1934 Acts, it does not have express statutory authority over indi-
viduals associated with such issuers. 266 Expansion to cover such indi-
viduals, whether by way of statutory revision or expansion of current
practice,2 67 would be advisable as a positive step toward increasing
SEC efficiency. This is particularly true as collateral estoppel princi-
ples may well aid the private plaintiff.
2 68
Conclusion
The essence of the changes in current SEC practice advocated
herein is to maximize the role of the Commission's investigatory and
adjudicatory power at the administrative level. Consequently, there
should be less emphasis on the SEC role in the courts, leaving judicial
263. See text accompanying notes 211-12 supra.
264. See notes 188-205 & accompanying text supra.
265. See text accompanying notes 123-45 supra.
266. See notes 46-78 & accompanying text supra.
267. See notes 79-103 & accompanying text supra.
268. See notes 188-205 & accompanying text supra.
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remedies primarily for criminal prosecutions and private litigants. In-
sofar as many of the proposals advocated herein can be accomplished
under the current statutory framework, there is no need to await legis-
lative reform. Congressional action, however, should not be discarded
as the best method of implementing these proposals.
